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Abstract Standard microbial evolutionary ontology is organized according to a
nested hierarchy of entities at various levels of biological organization. It typically
detects and defines these entities in relation to the most stable aspects of evolu-
tionary processes, by identifying lineages evolving by a process of vertical inheri-
tance from an ancestral entity. However, recent advances in microbiology indicate
that such an ontology has important limitations. The various dynamics detected
within microbiological systems reveal that a focus on the most stable entities (or
features of entities) over time inevitably underestimates the extent and nature of
microbial diversity. These dynamics are not the outcome of the process of vertical
descent alone. Other processes, often involving causal interactions between entities
from distinct levels of biological organisation, or operating at different time scales,
are responsible not only for the destabilisation of pre-existing entities, but also for
the emergence and stabilisation of novel entities in the microbial world. In this
article we consider microbial entities as more or less stabilised functional wholes,
and sketch a network-based ontology that can represent a diverse set of processes
including, for example, as well as phylogenetic relations, interactions that stabilise
or destabilise the interacting entities, spatial relations, ecological connections, and
genetic exchanges. We use this pluralistic framework for evaluating (i) the existing
ontological assumptions in evolution (e.g. whether currently recognized entities are
adequate for understanding the causes of change and stabilisation in the microbial
world), and (ii) for identifying hidden ontological kinds, essentially invisible from
within a more limited perspective. We propose to recognize additional classes of
entities that provide new insights into the structure of the microbial world, namely
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‘‘processually equivalent’’ entities, ‘‘processually versatile’’ entities, and ‘‘stabi-
lized’’ entities.
Keywords Ontology  Microbial evolution  Process philosophy  Tree of life 
Network
Introduction: biological ontology
Fundamental to any scientific view of the natural world is an ontology: a view of the
kinds of things, their most important properties and capacities, and their typical
interactions, that constitute the domain of nature under consideration. Ultimately we
assume that such an ontology must be empirically grounded. However, the central role
that ontological assumptions play in the articulation of the scientific investigation of a
domain is such that they are not easily questioned. They are deep within the Quinean
web of belief, or, to adapt a phrase from (Wimsatt 2007) to a different purpose,
generatively entrenched. Empirical results that appear to threaten this basic ontology
are liable to be reinterpreted or treated with suspicion. It can easily seem that the
central ontological assumptions are a priori foundations for the scientific domain. Most
fundamental to the ontological framework of a scientific field will be categories of
entities and the kinds of relations that hold between these entities. So, for example, the
basic ontology of chemistry might be atoms and the bonds that occur between atoms.
Needless to say, things will be more complicated and diverse for the life sciences.
As a quick preliminary, we should mention our understanding of what makes an
entity ‘real’ as opposed to a mere artefact of our representation. We assume that real
entities are those that have causal powers; complex entities are real if they have
causal powers that are not merely aggregates of the causal powers of their parts.
Organisms, for example, can do things that none of their parts can manage on their
own. Similarly functional proteins have capacities—catalytic, structural, etc.—that
are not exhibited by any of the amino acids of which they are composed. We don’t
want to commit to any particular account of causation; perhaps ‘having a causal
power’ means just ‘making a difference to something else’.1 Making a difference to
something is a minimal necessary condition for being the kind of entity we have any
interest in recognising in formulating a biological ontology.
A more abstract metaphysical distinction is also central to our thinking about
biological ontology (and perhaps ontology generally). We understand living things
to be most fundamentally the consequences of numerous interweaving (occasionally
nested) processes. Although it is common to describe the domain of biology as
consisting of things, for example organisms, cells, genes, and so on, we understand
even these as ultimately processual. As recent thinking in evolutionary biology,
notably the rapidly growing field of evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo)
has emphasised, an organism is a developmental process. When we use a set of
properties to describe the adult state of an organism, perhaps for taxonomic
1 The classic exposition of such a difference-making account of causation is Woodward (2003). More
robust accounts of causal powers can be found in Cartwright (1989) and Mumford and Anjum (2011).
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purposes, we are abstracting a particular time slice from this developmental process.
For these reasons, the ontology we aim to describe is an ontology of processes. A
processual ontology should characterize entities in terms of how they emerge, are
maintained and are stabilized. As evolution is uncontroversially a process, an
evolutionary ontology will quite naturally be processual. An evolutionary ontology
of the living world should distinguish the real evolutionary players, the units with
causal powers resulting from or contributing to evolutionary processes.
A further premise of our argument, which leads directly from the preceding
point, is that the naturalness with which we see the biological world as composed of
relatively stable things needs to be explained in terms of a variety of processes that
stabilise these entities. Such processes range from the multiple homeostatic
mechanisms that maintain metabolisms within viable parameters, to the stabilising
natural selection that maintains the viability of a population across generations. This
will be discussed in more detail below. Here we just reiterate that what we are
inclined to think of as biological things are, on more careful inspection, specific
temporal stages of stabilised biological processes. Furthermore, since these
stabilising processes take place at very different time scales—from many thousands
of years for the stabilising selection of a metazoan lineage, to as little as
milliseconds for the stabilisation of a functional macromolecule—whether an entity
appears as thing-like will depend on the time scale with which we are concerned.
Again, these ideas will be taken up in much more detail below.
While we believe that the argument of this paper would apply equally to the
ontogeny and phylogeny of multicellular organisms, in this paper we will focus on
the evolutionary ontology of the microbial world, where its application is most
clear-cut. By ‘microbes’ we mean what are generally referred to as unicellular
organisms: the prokaryotes, Bacteria and Archaea; a wide variety of protists and
fungi; and subcellular entities such as viruses and plasmids. This restriction does
still leave us with about 80 % of the history of life and the vast majority of entities
that have existed in the more recent 20 %. The complexity of microbes, we would
add, is often underappreciated. Microbes commonly engage in multicellular and
multilineage organisations, such as multispecies biofilms, in which microbial cells
undergo cellular differentiation, and exhibit some form of division of labor (Ghigo
2001; Hall-Stoodley et al. 2004; Reisner et al. 2006; Ereshefsky and Pedroso 2012).
So the limitation of our analysis to the microbial realm is a minor one.2
Evolutionary ontology: the standard model
The standard evolutionary ontology of biology is hierarchical. Starting with the
intuitively central category of organisms, one can work downwards through a
hierarchy of organs, cells, organelles, and molecules. This is a hierarchy in which
entities at each level are constituents of entities at the next higher level. Moreover it
2 The opposite neglect of the microbial world is, we would argue, a much commoner and more serious
fault. For a general argument for the importance of the microbial world, and the limitations imposed on
philosophy of biology by its neglect, see O’Malley and Dupre´ (2007).
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is possible to move upwards from the organism to the level of species, which are
themselves widely considered to be concrete individual entities of which organisms
are the constituent parts (Hull 1989). It has also been thought that this hierarchy is
the key to a proper scientific epistemology, since the scientific understanding of
entities at one level should be a consequence of discovering the properties of its
constituents at the next lower level. This reductionist view, however, has become
highly controversial and is anyhow not the topic of this essay. Here we are
concerned merely with how this standard evolutionary ontology, based on a
genealogy emphasizing vertical inheritance, has had a profound influence on the
structure of evolutionary thinking. The kind of thinking we have in mind is most
distinctively represented by the construction of genealogical trees, whether of
species, organisms, cells, genomes, genes, or whatever else.
Central to the tree model are the assumptions that through evolutionary time
entities replicate themselves (or are replicated), and that this process of replication
produces the reproductively linked sequences of similar entities that constitute
lineages. These lineages, then, are everywhere constrained within the limits of the
branch of the tree in which they are located. With what is generally considered the
minor exception of hybrids (Heliconius Genome Consortium 2012), lineages of
genes move between different organisms through reproduction and sexual
recombination, but only so long as the destination organism is located within the
same branch. The whole branch can be seen as an entity held together (at least for
organisms to which this applies) by the sexually mediated flow of genes between
organisms. Intermediate entities such as cells or genomes are simply carried along
by their organismic hosts, and for cladists, at least, the tree of species is just a higher
level representation of this same tree of organisms.
We certainly do not mean to deny that this evolutionary ontology has been
extremely productive for many parts of biology. It has, for example, justified and
guided the search for more representatives of the classes it recognises, notably
genes, organisms and species. Just one example would be the discrimination of
morphologically very similar sibling species on the basis of genetic separation
(Mayr 1963). More recently it has been used to justify the use of lower level entities
as proxies for investigating the structure and history of the biological world as
constituted by higher level entities. For example, the use of genetic analysis to map
the phylogenetic history of metazoa has provided many insights. But it must be
noted that only in so far as lineages of genes and lineages of species really are
constrained within the same branch of the tree are inferences from the history of
genes to the history of species legitimate. This condition implies that there are
severe limits to the model, and areas, for example phylogenetic analysis of
prokaryotes, where is has proved less effective (Bapteste et al. 2009).
Consequently, we will argue that in spite of its major contribution to evolutionary
studies, the tree picture has also provided us with some problematic ontological
entities, e.g. classes that are not causally real processes. In particular, it has often
encouraged the identification of evolutionary players—in our understanding the
units with causal powers either resulting from or contributing to evolutionary
processes—with phylogenetic species, and clades. But while clades have a historical
coherence, it is not clear that they constitute entities with causal powers of their
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own. Hence, a processual evolutionary perspective should provide something quite
distinct from the standard evolutionary ontology, by distinguishing the emergence
and stabilization of objects irrespective of any a priori partitions between distinct
levels of biological organisation (as when interactions between levels contribute to
the emergence/stabilization of new entities during evolution), and irrespective of
possibly artificial genealogical partitions (as when attention solely to genealogical
lineages ignores the origin and sustainability of associations between multiple
lineages into a functional unit).
Central to the standard model, and also central to the argument of this paper, is
the concept of a lineage. We will not attempt to offer any detailed analysis of this
important concept, but one uncontentious aspect is that it refers to sequences of
more or less similar entities over generally long periods of time. Sequences often
thought of as lineages could be of organisms, cells, genes, or genomes. But temporal
successions of organs, proteins, or indeed anything that occurs regularly in an
organism, could also be identified and might be considered as lineages. We shall
make just two points about such potential lineages. First, the processes that maintain
and stabilise these sequences are quite diverse. Certainly there must be such
processes to sustain a lineage, processes that explain the constant reproduction of
very similar entities, but we should not assume there is anything common to these
processes beyond their capacity to produce this outcome. Second, some lineages are
physically embedded within lineages of more complex entities. Thus lineages of
livers are entirely embedded in lineages of metazoan organisms. This is, no doubt,
the reason why lineages of livers do not attract much theoretical attention. If livers
could occasionally evolve in a manner spatially uncoupled from the whole that they
partially compose, they would be of great interest, no matter whether they reproduce
by themselves or are reproduced as a byproduct of the reproduction of some
containing entity (i.e. whether they are simple reproducers or scaffolded reproducers
(Godfrey-Smith 2009)). Gene lineages are precisely such embedded, yet evolution-
arily potentially independent, lineages in microbial organisms. When laterally
transferred genes encode for molecular ‘‘organs’’ (Forterre 2010), organs, too, can
move from one bacterium to another (e.g. a flagellum can be introduced into a
nonmotile bacterium (Diene et al. 2012)).
Like an organism, an organ such as the bacterial flagellum requires particular
genes to be reproduced, and mutations in these genes are physical marks of possible
transformations of this organ. Such mutations will track the lineage of flagella.
When such genes transfer laterally from one cell to another, the evolution of the
lineage of flagella as tracked by these mutations is uncoupled from that of the
lineage of its previous carrier, and thus becomes a potential object of study in its
own right: its evolution is now partly autonomous. If a particular flagellar
organisation lasted longer than the bacterial species in which it was first evolved it,
or any other part with a lifespan uncoupled from that of its embedding host, would
have an evolutionary history distinct not only from that of its original host, but also
from any subsequent host.
In the microbial world, lineages of genes, or genomes, are not fully embedded in
lineages of organisms, or even of species; lineages of genes can be independent
from lineages of genomes. The interweaving of independent though sometimes
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coincident lineages will be central to the general picture we hope to present. These
will include, in addition to those mentioned, lineages of mobile acellular genetic
elements such as viruses and plasmids, and lineages of symbiotic communities of
interacting organisms, though the complexity of the processes that sustain the latter
may make their lineage formation less central to the analysis. This interacting
multiplicity of kinds of lineage, with distinct stabilisation time scales and different
degrees of obligate physical connection, introduces important limitations to the
standard model that our alternative presentation of an extended evolutionary
ontology aims to address.
Problems with the standard model
The starting point for our understanding of microbial ontology is that the tree of life
as conventionally understood, far from being a universal framework, is a model of
limited usefulness for comprehending the microbial world. This is primarily because
of the phenomenon of lateral gene transfer (LGT): transfer of genes between often
very different kinds of organisms or, in the present context, cells (Bapteste et al.
2009). What this phenomenon implies is that, contrary to the simple ontological
vision embodied in the tree of life, the origins of the genetic components that are
found in a biological entity may be quite disparate (Bapteste and Burian 2010;
Baquero 2011; Dagan et al. 2008; Fondi and Fani 2010; Lima-Mendez et al. 2008;
Moustafa et al. 2009; Puigbo et al. 2010; Skippington and Ragan 2011a, b; Smillie
et al. 2011).
This, we think, is exemplary of a quite general characteristic of biological
entities. Rather than coming into being in a unitary way through a unique path (e.g.,
a series of ever smaller branches in the tree of life) biological entities typically
involve the coming together of a range of constituents often from diverse sources
(Bapteste et al. 2012; Bouchard 2010; Hatfull et al. 2008; Lane and Archibald 2008;
Lima-Mendez et al. 2008; Martin and Embley 2006; Moustafa et al. 2009;
Zhaxybayeva et al. 2009). Another, perhaps more controversial, example is of the
organism. If one thinks of the organism not within the ontological framework
provided by the tree of life, but rather in terms of the functional wholes that interact
with their wider biological and abiotic contexts, then it is rapidly apparent that these
wholes typically involve a variety of entities with quite disparate origins. Typical
metazoans require diverse and numerous microbial symbionts to function normally
(Greenblum et al. 2012; Lozupone et al. 2008; Qu et al. 2008). Microbes themselves
are most commonly found in complex collaborations such as biofilms (Ghigo 2001;
Hall-Stoodley et al. 2004; Reisner et al. 2006). There is an increasingly compelling
case for taking the whole symbiotic system as the most basic referent for the term
‘organism’ (Dupre´ and O’Malley 2009).
So the problem with the tree of life grounding our ideas about evolutionary
ontology is that it privileges one particular biological relation, that of vertical
inheritance from parent to offspring, and one type of entity, namely those with
genealogical coherence. Hence this model, which is focused exclusively on
genealogical relations, will give a very partial evolutionary ontology, a deficient
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inventory of the causal players in the evolutionary process. Of course, all scientific
representations in biology are to some degree abstractions from the full complexity
of living systems, so it is no sufficient criticism of the tree of life that it emphasises
one set of relations over others (Wimsatt 2007; Levins 1984). And undoubtedly its
genealogical focus has provided important insights in some areas of biology,
notably eukaryote systematics. Abstraction also raises an ever-present danger,
however, which is that part of the truth will be taken as the whole truth (Cartwright
1983; Dupre´ 1993). A particularly interesting instance of this danger is the
possibility of substantial distortion of the basic ontology of a field, in this case the
reduction of an evolutionary ontology to a genealogical ontology. The tree of life,
we think, by insisting on the predominant importance of vertically transmitted
origin as the defining feature of biological entities, has tended to promote just such
an error, marginalising evolutionarily significant entities that did not evolve along
the single, privileged tree.
The prevalence of lateral gene transfer among microbes gives the tree of life an
additional disadvantage of being almost impossible to identify (Bapteste et al. 2008;
Dagan and Martin 2006). It is true that there must, in principle, be an actual
historical tree of cells, since cells do, barring some very rare if evolutionarily
decisive events such as the origin of the eukaryote cell, always bifurcate in
reproduction. But extensive lateral gene transfer makes this tree of cells impossible
to discern since any genetic marker we use to trace the relevant reproductive
relations will give us only a gene tree, a history of that gene. And lateral gene
transfer implies that different gene trees cannot be relied upon to coincide on any
unique tree of cells. Moreover, even if it were accurately reconstructible, such a tree
of cells would be of dubious utility, since lateral gene transfer also implies that the
genetically derived capacities of a cell could not be inferred from its position in the
tree of cells.
The problem can best be understood in terms of different time scales, a
perspective we shall emphasise throughout this paper. Even in the absence of lateral
gene transfer, the branching pattern of the gene lineage (produced by mutations)
cannot be directly translated into the branching pattern of the cell lineage (produced
by cellular divisions). Mutation events occur at a different time scale than do events
of cellular division. Sometimes, mutations accumulate faster in the cell than the cell
divides; sometimes (most of the time) the cell divides faster than mutations
accumulate in the gene. Therefore, the gene lineage generally evolves more slowly
than the cell lineage. But whatever the specific rates of evolution, there is no reason
to assume a direct correspondence between the gene lineage and the cellular lineage
in which genes from that family were embedded. A gene tree, in sum, is a tree of
genes not a tree of cells. Consequently, it seems that we need a more complex
representation of the interactions and processes within the microbiological world
than can be provided by giving ontological priority to either the tree of life (if such
there be) or the tree of cells. We intend to sketch such a model in this paper.
In moving to an ontological framework that goes beyond the limitations of the
standard model, and that recognises a variety of distinct and non-coincident
genealogies, we aim to avoid the monism that frequently infects the standard
ontological framework. We recognise, for example, that entities may have quite
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different roles in different systems and that the ontology may seem quite different
when we adopt perspectives that emphasise different features. As an extreme
illustration of the first point we might think of DNA sequences that mimic proteins
(Zack et al. 1995; Dryden and Tock 2006), often to counteract various kinds of
immune response. Such sequences thus belong in some contexts in the same
functional categories as the proteins they mimic. Of course in other contexts, such as
DNA sequence replication, DNA protein mimics function as normal DNA. Less
exotic are so-called moonlighting proteins, proteins that function in quite different
ways in different cellular contexts. The use of the term ‘‘moonlighting’’ nicely
displays the deep assumption that normally a molecule has one proper function, and
something is out of the ordinary when it is discovered doing something different
(Henderson and Martin 2011; Huberts and van der Klei 2010; Collingridge et al.
2010). More familiar, perhaps, is the realisation that genes, far from having one
specific function may, by virtue of such mechanisms as alternative splicing, end up
with many different protein products serving a range of functions (Bondos and
Hsiao 2012; Toor et al. 2006). We take this to be a self-evidently sensible strategy
for biological systems to evolve: surely it is efficient to use entities that an organism
has the resources to produce for as many functions as they can be made to serve.
Monism is not a necessary concomitant of the standard ontology, but we think that it
fits easily with the linear focus on vertical inheritance: the function of an entity is its
role in driving the evolving lineage along its branch of the tree. Though it is well
known that homology alone may not provide a reliable guideline for functional
classification, it is nevertheless often the case that homology is used to infer
functional information, for example in the. functional annotation of genes using
COG, or KEGG databases3 (Tanabe and Kanehisa 2012; Tatusov et al. 2001).
The issue of entities with multiple functions—a possibility that may easily be
obscured by the attribution of a single place in a hierarchical ontology—is one
aspect of a much broader pluralism that we think an adequate evolutionary ontology
must encompass, and one central reason for rejecting the standard ontology that has
attributed overwhelming importance to just one process, phylogeny. We need an
ontology that can represent a diverse set of processes including, for example, as well
as phylogenetic relations, interactions that stabilise or destabilise the interacting
entities, spatial relations, ecological connections, genetic exchanges, etc. In the next
section we will offer a sketch of a network that aims to represent a variety of
processes connecting different entities. The network model we have in mind should
be able to detect, for example, cases in which the functional signature is stronger
than or even contradicts the phylogenetic signal of an entity (Dinsdale et al. 2008;
Kav et al. 2012; Lozupone et al. 2008). Indeed, what we are aiming to describe, at
least as a theoretical ideal, is a synoptic picture including both microbial entities at
multiple levels and multiple connecting processes. A network seems a natural way
3 Clusters of Orthologous Groups (COGs) of proteins are generated by comparing the protein sequences
of complete prokaryotic genomes; each of these clusters is classified into one or several functional
categories, such as, for instance, RNA processing and modification, or cell-cycle control and mitosis. The
KEGG database is an integrated database in which molecular-level information is classified in ways that
facilitate the systemic study of the molecular interactions and chemical reactions in which genes are
involved in an organism.
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to represent diverse kinds of entities (as nodes) and diverse kinds of relations (by
edges), even though this representation will only be able to provide a static
representation of the processes affecting biological entities. In principle, the
dynamics of these processes (and how they unfold over time) can be investigated by
the reconstruction of series of temporally delimited networks, each of them
corresponding to a particular time slice. However, in practice this is still too
complex an enterprise, but the introduction of a static apparatus will already
improve how microbiologists capture the variety of processes that stabilise entities
within any of a wide range of time scales. Such networks are already being used,
and have met with increasing interest in the microbiological community (Skipp-
ington and Ragan 2011b; Skippington and Ragan 2012).
We do not suggest that any imaginable model could capture every possible
perspective or set of processes. But representing several that we take to be
especially important will at least give us a reasonable sense of the partiality of
particular perspectives, and the kinds of ways in which different perspectives
overlap and interact.4 Finally, though, we also want to set some limits on the lush
ontology we are proposing. We hope that it maintains a proper naturalness, and
avoids the completely artificial or artefactual. The key idea here is that we are
looking for entities that have, as briefly mentioned above, some distinctive causal
power. A pattern in the model we describe provides a candidate for a significant
entity. Confirmation of that status requires that its causal efficacy in vivo, or at least
in vitro, be demonstrated.
A crucial motivation for adopting the framework we propose is that the standard
phylogenetic model obscures the implications of the different rates of biological
processes, and we conclude this section with some further remarks on that issue. We
have noted that the stabilisations of process that result in what we standardly treat as
biological objects occur in specific and diverse time frames. This creates a problem
for the inferences generally licensed by the standard model, a problem that is
independent of, and perhaps even deeper than, the problem of intersecting lineages.
This problem arises from the fact that these inferences, for example from patterns of
genes to patterns of species, implicitly make assumptions about the relevant time
scales of the processes that stabilise the entities in these processes, and these
assumptions may often be incorrect.
It will be helpful to approach the problem by thinking of a much simpler
example, and one that starts with something far from obviously conceived as the
temporally stabilized result of processes, a mountain. While a mountain may be
unequivocally part of the stable background of largely unchanging things from the
perspective of a hiker ascending its slopes, from the point of view of geology it is a
very slow process. Consider the small mountains or hills on Dartmoor in South-
West England. These are typically topped by tors, impressive piles of huge granite
rocks, left behind by the erosion of the softer material that originally covered them.
Eventually, perhaps, these granite extrusions may be all that is left of these features.
4 The pluralism defended earlier by one of us (Dupre´ (1993)) insufficiently emphasised the important
problem of bringing multiple perspectives to bear on particular problems. This problem is addressed by
Mitchell (2003).
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Though these were parts of the relevant, or ancestral, features for as long as they
existed (since they were extruded), it would be wrong to infer from attention to
these maximally stable constituents over time that the entity to which they belong
had at all times been a pile of granite. Indeed it is currently a more complex mixture
of different kinds of parts. And even more importantly, it would clearly be wrong to
assume that the bits of granite had always been part of a tor or mountain at all. For
example, during the late Cretaceous Dartmoor was submerged by the rising sea
level, and the granite was covered with a limestone deposit; subsequently sea levels
fell, the land re-emerged, and the limestone covering was eroded, re-exposing the
granite. In the Cretaceous, then, the lumps of granite were parts of the sea bed. If
lumps of granite are more stable entities than mountains or sea beds, the history of a
lump of granite does not correspond to the history of mountains or sea beds. We
suggest that such an inference from stablest constituent to a stable kind of entity of
which it is part is a central, very common, and problematic style of inference within
the standard model.
Consider the use of ribosomal genes in phylogenetic inference. These genes were
selected precisely because of their assumed high level of stability—or more
precisely the stability of their lineages—over long periods of time. The stabilisation
process is assumed to be selection for a vital feature of all cells. The problem is with
the attempt to infer general characteristics of entities, evolving at a different time
scale and often at other levels (organisms, species), from these maximally stabilised
features. We know that lineages of organisms and species are stabilised over much
shorter time scales; so any such inference runs the risk of a mistake parallel to the
conclusion that Dartmoor tors were always piles of bare granite or that pieces of this
granite were always parts of tors. We offer two brief examples of such errors.
The first relates to the question of microbial species. Increasingly many
microbiologists will now deny that there is any interesting analogue of the eukaryote
species in the prokaryote world, but this remains a hotly contested issue (Doolittle
and Zhaxybayeva 2009; Gevers et al. 2005; Mora et al. 2011). Resistance to
abandoning the notion of species for prokaryotes rests in part, we suggest, on the
implicit idea that if, using highly stable markers such as ribosomal genes, we are
able to trace evolutionary history into the prokaryote past, we must be tracing
essentially the same homogeneous process involving throughout the same kinds of
entities. But in fact we know that the history of the entities containing these
relatively most stable genes is composed of many different time scales of
stabilisation, so a gene tree provides no reason for assuming a similar general
structure of species throughout the evolutionary time span of its existence. The
problem here is not merely the familiar one that genes (or even non-coding DNA
segments) must be selected with an appropriate rate of evolution for tackling a
particular phylogenetic issue (Yang 1998). It is rather that the standard evolutionary
ontology is used in ways that ignore the fundamental difficulty in inferring the
ontological status of rapidly changing wholes from the study of slowly evolving
parts. The use of existing ontological categories to interpret the branching of a gene
tree as if these categories were fixed throughout the entire history of the gene can
lead to error. For instance, sexual and asexual eukaryotes may have histones with
the exact same sequence. However, sexual and asexual species should be considered
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as having distinct ontologies: they are not generated, affected or stabilized by the
same processes. There need not be any branchings in the histone (or equally
ribosomal) tree that correspond to a divergence between sexual and asexual species.
Because the standard evolutionary ontology encourages the unwarranted assumption
of an evolutionary coupling between parts and wholes, it is particularly ill-suited to
making inferences about the general structure of living processes across major
evolutionary transitions (Fig. 1).
Our second example shows that the problem is not limited to inferences about the
past. Consider the human gut microbiome. At a certain point in the investigation of
this entity it appeared that there were considerable differences in the populations of
microbes found in humans in different parts of the world as measured by standard
16S rRNA methods. One might easily have imagined that by comparing these
different microbiota we could discover, for instance, which were the essential
Fig. 1 Decoupling of changes in sequence and carrier-ontology.
The evolution of the relatively most stable entities used to track evolutionary changes in the microbial
world (e.g. sequences from a well conserved gene family) can be represented by a tree. The branching and
ancestral nodes in such a gene tree are commonly used to infer the presence of a particular type of
evolutionary event (e.g. speciation, transfer, etc.), affecting a particular class of less stable entities (e.g.
ancestral organism, species, etc.). However, the difference of time scales for the stabilisation of the most
stable entities and that for the other entities that these slowly evolving sequences are supposed to be
tracking makes it impossible to infer a direct correspondence between the changes recorded in the gene
tree and those that have occurred in other entities. Dichotomies and divergences in the gene tree cannot be
directly coupled to changes in the ontology of the gene carriers, and the evolutionary events affecting less
stable entities of which this gene is a component. There is not necessarily information on the gene tree
alone about what type of entities carried a particular ancestral gene form, and about whether and when
these types of entities may have dramatically changed, i.e. when the evolution of novel classes of
sequence-based entities resulted in major (hypothetical) evolutionary transitions. (Interested readers can
see Gross and Bhattacharya (2010), Koonin and Martin (2005), and Woese (1990) for more details on
some of these transitions.) Such decoupling means that gene trees are informative about gene history, but
may not be informative about the evolution of other entities, contrary to what is assumed in a standard
ontology, which couples the evolutionary history of parts and wholes. Fig. 1 represents important
ontological transitions by changes in branch format. Because of these changes, relatively similar
sequences in a branching lineage may reside in different types of (sometimes novel) entities with different
time scales for their stabilisation. Interpreting a sequence tree with a single ontology from present to past
will then provide a severely distorted view of evolution
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symbionts and which were more opportunistic visitors. However, as metagenomic
methods were developed and applied to these populations it emerged that the total
genetic constitution of different gut microbiomes was far more similar than
indicated by 16S rRNA taxonomy (Kav et al. 2012; Lozupone et al. 2008). The
explanation is fairly clear. The object that is stabilised by the constraints of the
animal gut is the metagenome of the whole community: this provides the genetic
resources required for normal animal functions. Lineages of microbes are much less
stable and more diverse, with many genes moving between them. So the relatively
stable genetic resources required for the animal gut community can be provided by a
wide variety of relatively less stable collections of lineages. Inferences from the
discovery that a bacterial lineage serves a necessary function in a particular gut, to
the conclusion that this is an essential animal symbiont, would be quite unjustified.
Proper inference in this area requires identifying the relevant stabilised entities
serving the various functions of the gut microbiome, and this is a higher level entity
than the lineages of bacteria that seem the natural objects of interest within the
standard model. We suspect that failure to pay attention to the different time scales
at which entities are stabilised can lead to serious distortions in our inferences about
the existence of biological entities at particular times. Understanding the linkages
and uncouplings between nested hierarchies of entities absolutely requires such
attention: time scales for the stabilisation of entities should feature as an integral
aspect of the evolutionary ontology.
A multidimensional framework for microbial ontology
Microbiologists have so far grounded their ontologies largely on a single process.
Vertical descent with modification can be taken to underlie various taxonomic
projects: the classification of organisms into a particular species; the classification of
genes into functional categories (Tatusov et al. 2001); stabilization of sets of
metabolic capacities to classify entities with specific impacts on geochemical
processes, for example multiple species as denitrifiers; and so on. Occasionally,
investigations go beyond the vertical inheritance model to enhance the understand-
ing of complex microbial systems, for example to determine which functional
categories of genes were vertically inherited or laterally transferred in denitrifiers
yet not in other species (Falkowski et al. 2008). However, we argue that such cross-
fertilisation of ontological information should be made more systematic in order to
expand the explanatory power of studies of the microbial world. We propose a
model that starts with as wide a range of currently recognised entities as possible, at
multiple levels of organisations, and makes room for multiple processes affecting
these entities. Such a model could provide a powerful framework for evaluating
(i) our existing ontological assumptions (e.g. whether the currently distinguished
entities are adequate for understanding the causes of change and stabilisation in the
microbial world), as well as (ii) for identifying potentially hidden ontological
classes, thereby recognising additional entities that provide new insights into the
structure of the microbial world (Skippington and Ragan 2012, 2011b).
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Consideration of well-known features of microbial organisation makes the
recourse to such a multidimensional framework compelling. The evolution of the
majority of known microbial communities and coalitions involves entities from
multiple levels of biological organisation, participating in a wide range of biological
processes (Ghigo 2001; Hall-Stoodley et al. 2004; Overmann 2010; Reisner et al.
2006; Smillie et al. 2011). Take for instance the well-studied coalition between
oceanic photosynthetic bacteria and their phages carrying photosynthetic genes. In
this coalition, infection results in an increase of photosynthetic productivity in
infected bacteria, thereby preventing the extinction of the bacterial population
(Alperovitch-Lavy et al. 2011; Sullivan et al. 2006; Hellweger 2009). An accurate
(and dynamic) model of the evolution of lineages of such cyanobacteria requires (at
least) the consideration of three biological levels: mobile genetic elements, bacterial
cells, and the integrated community formed by the coalition of mobile elements and
bacterial cells. It also requires the comprehension of several processes: the transfer
of genetic material (e.g. the psbA photosynthetic gene) between cyanophages,
between cyanophages and bacterial cells, and between bacterial cells; the stabilising
selection against changes in that photosynthetic gene in all the entities carrying the
genes; the replication of cells and of phages; and arguably group selection favouring
these coalitions (Villarreal 2009) over populations of cyanobacteria infected by
phages that do not carry photosynthetic genes. Not all of these processes can be
directly mapped onto the hierarchy based on vertical descent among entities within
a single branch of the tree of life.
We propose to replace the hierarchical one-dimensional framework with a
multidimensional framework, in which processual interactions between these
microbial entities, crossing over what are generally seen as distinct levels of
biological organisations, can be explicitly modelled (Fig. 2).
As a first step, we propose the construction of networks with nodes of distinct
types, representing different ontological categories of entities, and edges of distinct
types, representing different types of causal interactions or other biologically
Fig. 2 Schematic representation of a multidimensional network.
Nodes are previously recognized entities, from different levels of biological organisation (indicated by
different symbols). The value ‘1’ means that two entities were inferred to result from, or be involved in, a
particular process (represented by an edge with a particular line type), ‘0’ means that no such relationship
could be inferred. The matrix to the left would result in the network to the right. This picture could
provide a less biased and partial representation that will enable us both to analyse, and to suggest methods
for the detection of, the ontology for this kind of common example from microbiology
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significant relations (e.g., homology, collocation–the tendency to appear in the same
place) occurring between these entities. This graph contrasts with the graph used in
the standard ontology: the evolutionary tree is an acyclic graph on which all nodes
are necessarily connected, while our network can be cyclic and disconnected.
To make this approach analytically tractable, the number of types of nodes and of
edges should be limited. We propose that nodes should represent gene sequences,
proteins, cells, mobile genetic elements, and communities. Three main types of edges
should be sufficient to provide useful information about the relations within systems
that include representatives of these types of entities. First, edges reflecting processes
responsible for particular similarities between these nodes could offer an initial
structuring of the network. These similarity-generating processes could be further
distinguished into (i) processes of vertical inheritance, resulting in a global similarity
between genealogically related entities (i.e. two gene sequences that would align along
all their sequence) (Adai et al. 2004); (ii) processes of recombination introducing
partial, local similarities between entities resulting from these combinations and the
lineages that recombined (i.e. two gene sequences that would only align over part of
their sequences); (iii) selective pressures leading to convergent phenotypes (e.g.
enrichment in hydrophobic amino acid in transmembrane proteins (Koehler et al.
2009), or GC-biased gene conversion (Hildebrand et al. 2010)). Second, edges
reflecting causal interactions between nodes, such as the transfer of biological material
(e.g. DNA, protein, cells) between two entities, or processes resulting in conflicts
between these entities (e.g. predation, arms races, etc.) could be searched for. These
interactions could be further characterized as stabilizing or destabilizing (Bapteste
et al. 2012). Third, and finally, edges should represent collocation, the fact that two
entities are typically found close together or in the same place.
As one example, a simple approach to the detection of stabilizing selection at a
molecular level in a network of microbial entities could be to explore whether the
genes shared by these entities (each represented by a node) are under purifying
selection. The result of classical KA/KS analysis between groups of connected
sequences (i.e. the ratio of the number of non-synonymous substitutions per non-
synonymous site (KA) to the number of synonymous substitutions per synonymous
site (KS), which provides an indicator of selective pressure acting on a protein-
coding gene), could thus be incorporated in the network by reporting edges of
different colours for different values of KA/KS. The detection of groups of entities
sharing sequences undergoing similar selection could be linked by an edge, which
would reveal groups of entities affected by the same stabilizing selection on
particular genes. It would also be possible with such a network to represent
communities of genetic exchanges (compare Skippington and Ragan 2011a) based
on edges of stabilizing selection at the gene level. Finally, edges reflecting processes
responsible for the collocation of entities in the microbial world would introduce
relevant information on the coming together of these entities at a given
spatiotemporal scale, or on ecological selective processes causing these entities to
inhabit a given type of environment. Each of these types of edges introduces a
dimension along which the behaviour of entities from the microbial world (e.g. their
patterns of connection to other entities in the network) can be studied.
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Such a rich network would offer a much closer approximation to a synoptic
picture of the causal interactions between, and longer causal chains connecting,
microbial entities, and their dynamics. Some causal chains are made of a single type
of interaction; other causal chains result from a mixture of several different types.
Our network model therefore offers a natural framework to represent the cascading
effects or positive feedback loops that sustain the existence of biological entities.
Such a multidimensional network can be directly applied to tackle several of the
ontological issues described above. First, it makes explicit both the causal relations
that initiate change and those that foster stability; it therefore highlights the ultimately
processual character of the entities in our basic ontological framework. Moreover,
representing processes at different time-scales brings out the fact that what are treated
in the standard evolutionary model as stable, maximally coherent, entities are in
reality only units sufficiently stabilised to be treatable as fixed relative to a particular
time-scale for the purposes of a particular problem. (Recalling our illustrative
example, while a walker can very properly treat a mountain as a fixed feature of the
environment, from the perspective of tectonics it is a particular phase in a process.)
Furthermore, our networks can represent both the causal interactions of parts of an
entity, when these parts are represented by nodes, and the causal interactions of the
whole with different entities (and different parts of different entities). In that
framework it is natural to expect that the relationships between higher level entities
change when the relationships between their component parts change. Such a network
thus provides a more comprehensively dynamic vision of microbial entities, allowing
for modifications to an entity introduced by changes in the relationships between its
parts, either by changes in the relationships of the whole to other entities, or by
relations of its parts to other entities. This is a strength of the general framework,
because it does not privilege the most stable categories in understanding a
fundamentally dynamic biological world. This framework also offers a basis on
which to model the stabilisation and destabilisation of an entity over time. These
changes are caused by distinct influences (both internal and external) affecting a
given entity, and are represented by different types of edges. We thus explicitly
acknowledge the way in which features of the context in which it is placed contribute
to determining the identity (or indeed change of identity) of a higher level entity. It
should then become possible to determine when changes in the external or internal
relationships of an entity, visualized as features in the multidimensional topology of
some part of the causal network, may justify distinguishing new entities perhaps not
recognised in pre-existing ontological classes.
One example, in which moving to a more complex multidimensional perspective
might motivate a major change in ontology, is the distinction microbiologists make
between core and shell (peripheral) genes (Charlebois and Doolittle 2004; Medini
et al. 2005; Lukjancenko et al. 2010) to provide a criterion for ontological change:
provided an entity includes the core genes of E. coli, then an E. coli is what it is. A
more useful approach might be to recognise that changes in peripheral genes,
connected also to changes in the environment of a particular E. coli strain, produce
such radical modifications in its causal relations that we should recognise it as a
quite distinct kind of entity. We hope that the model we are sketching, by giving a
wider picture of these causal relations, would provide a better motivated basis for
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making such decisions. While the connections established between entities by core
genes are unlikely to change (unless all the core genes are lost), connections
established by peripheral genes may vary significantly between individuals, when
for instance a gene acquisition opens a new ecological niche to its carrier or exposes
it to novel selective processes (Lopez and Bapteste 2009; Fondi and Fani 2010;
Kloesges et al. 2011; Popa et al. 2011).
Expanding microbial evolutionary ontology
The framework offered by our network model makes possible the observation of
patterns of connections orthogonal to the expected ones for entities of a particular pre-
existing class. This could lead to the recognition of additional ontological classes, in
terms of which aspects of biological diversity could also be measured. More
specifically, we anticipate three major types of significant pattern that might be
observed in the network, which might lead us to postulate the existence of specific types
of entities: (i) ‘‘processually equivalent’’ entities (PE-entities), (ii) ‘‘processually
versatile’’ entities (PV-entities), and (iii) ‘‘stabilized’’ entities (S-entities) (Fig. 3).
PE-entities are entities that are seen to play a similar role in the network model,
because they display significant common topological local properties (i.e. they share
the same direct neighbours) (Fig. 3a). More precisely, entities could be called
equivalent if they share at least one causal chain (e.g. one path in common in the
network). It might be useful to treat processual equivalence as a matter of degree:
the higher the proportion of shared paths between two entities among all the paths in
the network model, the higher their degree of processual equivalence.
Defining classes of PE-entities is, of course, one thing the standard ontology aims
to achieve, and sometimes succeeds in achieving. For example, to the extent that
belonging to a species (i.e. being part of the same genealogical lineage) determines
organisms as having the same causal powers and relations, then this is a useful way
Fig. 3 Examples of some patterns that can be found in a multidimensional network.
Nodes are previously recognised entities. Edges indicates similarity, collocation or causal relationships
between two entities. Entities from different levels of biological organisation are represented by different
shapes. When edges are observed in different conditions, or result from, or are involved in, different
causal processes, they are represented by a different line type. a In black, two PE-entities, sharing a
significant fraction of direct neighbours. b In black, a PV-entity, involved in different causal chains, in
different conditions. When this node is removed, the graph disconnects in multiple subgraphs, therefore
the PV-entity is a local clique minimal separator of the graph. c Three sets of S-entities. On the left,
S-entities are stabilized by the same process. On the right, S-entities are stabilized by the interplay of
different processes. At the bottom, S-entities are stabilized by multiple processes
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of generating processually equivalent classes. The same possibility arises for
lineages of genes and gene families. When the assumption of processual
equivalence within a genealogical class fails, however, reasons for their processual
heterogeneity can be searched for in (at least) two directions. First, they may just be
classes with minimal explanatory interest or significance. The proposal of such
classes is not uncommon in systematics. For instance, the category of Chromal-
veolates (a large hypothetical clade of eukaryotes, allegedly deriving from an event
of secondary endosymbiosis of a red alga within a eukaryotic cell with two flagella)
has recently been shown to correspond to an artefactual grouping of unicellular
eukaryotes, about which it would be difficult to justify any systematic generaliza-
tions (Hackett et al. 2007). More interestingly, this heterogeneity may point toward
a genuine processual versatility within that class of entities (see below).
Another very significant possibility is that we may unexpectedly distinguish
classes of PE-entities that are highly diverse either structurally or genealogically or
both. Such classes might include entities from distinct levels of organisation, or
distantly related entities, that nevertheless play the same causal roles. Paradigmatic
for this case is the evolution of mimics, for example a protein that mimics DNA to
overcome the defences of restriction-modification systems (McMahon et al. 2009).
Such cases would be displayed in the multidimensional network when a bit of DNA
and a protein not coded by that DNA, or several genealogically unrelated proteins,
exhibit largely overlapping sets of direct neighbours. This pattern indicates that
these entities have largely similar causal effects, suggesting that they play very
similar or identical roles in the workings of the microbial world.
PV-entities are entities that are homogeneous in a traditional sense (structural or
genealogical) but are involved in a number of different causal processes. In our
network model, the set of direct neighbours of a PV-entity will change in different
contexts (Fig. 3b). As with processual equivalence, processual versatility could be
quantified based on the topological properties of these entities in the network. For
instance, the number of disconnected causal chains to which that entity belongs can
be computed by removing the node corresponding to that entity, followed by the
count of the n locally disconnected causal chains that result from this procedure.
The larger the value of n, the more versatile the entity is.
The observation that accepted categories such as species, or lineages, are PV-
entities is important for two reasons. First, if these categories are genuinely
explanatory units, this versatility may very well help to explain their evolutionary
success. Second, if a class of entities is processually versatile, we need to be
cautious about its suitability for broad generalization. For instance, if being part of a
species (e.g. E. coli) entailed that E. coli individuals would all behave similarly,
then individual E. coli cells in the network would be expected to have a rather
similar set of topological properties (e.g. similar patterns of gene transfer). If, on the
other hand, contextual differences could affect the causal powers exhibited by
distinct E. coli cells, then the class defined by this criterion would be shown to be of
seriously limited significance. If the goal of classification is to provide classes with
members that possess similar properties or, in terms of our network model, that
display the same pattern of connection, then processual versatility is a defect in a
putative class. More constructively, the detection of PV-entities emphasizes the fact
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that no quasi-essentialist assumption should be made about prokaryotic species. Not
all E. coli are pathogens, because pathogenicity can come from externally acquired
(or internal) changes in the individual cells, for instance as the result of the gain or
loss of mobile elements such as pathogenicity islands (Bezuidt et al. 2011;
Beauregard-Racine et al. 2011; Lukjancenko et al. 2010).
Entities at a lower level than the organism or species may also prove processually
versatile. It is sometimes supposed that a given gene sequence, for instance, should
be expected always to code for the same (set of) function(s), and a protein always to
perform the same function(s). Many genes indeed may very well carry invariant
genetic instructions, so that if these genes are laterally transferred from one
organism to another, they will, if expressed, code for proteins achieving the same
effect in the two organisms (Smillie et al. 2011; Alperovitch-Lavy et al. 2011). The
nature of the gene (or the protein), in short, is often seen as largely independent of
the context, robust to external variations. Changes in the context may make the
gene/protein useless or toxic (Sorek et al. 2007), but will not change the
fundamental functional nature of that molecule.
But by contrast to this highly stable—almost essentialist—view of the gene or
protein, it is also possible that a given genetic sequence does not encode a single (set
of) instruction(s), but that the context largely determines what the gene or protein
does, and therefore even what it is. And in fact it is well-known that genes are
capable of doing different things in different contexts, as is shown, for instance, by
the phenomenon of alternative splicing. For the case of proteins we have the
phenomenon of moonlighting, described above. Our network model would be
expected to distinguish such versatile entities (or classes) as belonging to two or
more distinct and disconnected causal clusters. Dynamic analysis of the network
might enable us to distinguish features that function as differentiating context, and
features that emerge as consequences of the particular context.
S-entities, finally, are another very important ontological category. They
correspond to sets of entities that are detectable because their connections are
stabilized, either by a single type of process, or by multiple types of processes (e.g.
cliques5 or quasi-cliques of causally related nodes, Fig. 3c). In the latter case, either
the interplay of multiple processes is responsible for the stabilized unit, or the
superposition of several independent but distinct processes. (An example here
would be the various distinct mechanisms that promote the formation of
microtubules in the elaboration of the mitotic spindle (Duncan and Wakefield
2011)). The coexistence of several distinct stabilising mechanisms is an especially
strong indication of a robust and biologically significant stabilised entity. This is
potentially important in determining the boundaries of complex assemblies such as,
for example, biofilms (Hall-Stoodley et al. 2004). The extent to which stabilising
links connect a particular kind of entity to the assembly should be a guide to
whether that entity should be considered a part of the larger whole, or a distinct
entity interacting with it.
5 A clique in an undirected graph is a subset of its vertices such that every two vertices in the subset are
connected by an edge.
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In general, to highlight novel instances of ontological classes that are not the
usual families of entities sharing a common ancestry, we propose the detection of
‘‘clubs’’ (Bapteste et al. 2012): stabilized groups of entities with one or more
detectable causal powers, resulting from the interplay of processes of evolution and
development orthogonal to processes generating the tree of cells. In theory, if
networks from successive temporal slices could be reconstructed, they would further
provide clues about the dynamics of stabilisation of such clubs.
One interesting kind of club includes bacteria and their phages. Typically, when a
free-living alphaproteobacterium acquires an endosymbiotic plasmid that confers
the ability to grow in nodules of plants, roots will acquire peripheral genes that
introduce this free-living alphaproteobacterium into the bacterial community that is
selected within the plant root nodule (Sullivan et al. 2002). The local topological
properties around that bacterium in the gene sharing network were changed by the
acquisition of these mobile genes, since new partnerships with a densely connected
set of endosymbiotic bacteria were thereby introduced.
Another example of traces left in temporal slices of the network as these entities
become stabilized could be found by contrasting the relationships between entities in a
network before and after the emergence of a novel chimerical organism, such as a
lichen (Grube and Hawksworth 2007), or the first eukaryotes (Martin and Mu¨ller 1998;
Moreira and Lopez-Garcia 1998). The local neighbourhood of such novel nodes, i.e. the
set of other nodes to which the super-organismal node is directly connected, would be
unprecedented in the graph. Most importantly, it would include nodes that were not
direct neighbours before the emergence of the super-organism. It could capture such
phenomena as the aggregation of micro-organisms and mobile elements such as
plasmids into a growing biofilm, or their selection as members of a stable multilevel
club, as for instance in the case of marine cyanobacteria and cyanophages (Alperovitch-
Lavy et al. 2011; Sullivan et al. 2006). It could also detect the process of fragmentation
in monophyletic groups (such as species) as their members undergo some kind of
divergence. Causes of these divergences might even be revealed, if for instance
members of a species show connections indicating that they are under the influence of
different groups of phages. This situation is indeed known to lead to the evolution of
populations of microbes with uneven fitnesses, and eventually to the extinction of some
of these diversifying populations, when members of the species carrying a particular
phage migrate or come in contact with other members of the same species that are not
immune to that phage (Villarreal 2009). Importantly, robust communities in the
network that do not match any simple category of the standard ontology (i.e.
communities involving entities from multiple levels of biological organisation or
distantly related lineages) will likely constitute S-entities that would be invisible from
within more traditional perspectives (i.e. communities of genetic exchanges involving
multiple lineages (Skippington and Ragan 2011a).
Explanatory use of non-standard ontological classes
The identification of the most significant set of entities is an essential precondition
for the scientific analysis of the microbial world. It determines the types of
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statements that can be made about nature, because it provides the objects about
which statements can be made. In the case of the standard ontology it not only
provides the entities, but since it is grounded in a single process, it also provides a
favoured set of relationships in terms of which these entities are likely to be better
understood. Typically, evolutionary scenarios in microbial evolution are focused on
the genealogical relationships between monophyletic groups. They firstly seek to
explain the structures observed in microbial diversity in terms of sister-groups,
divergence, and common ancestry. The recourse to different or additional
ontological classes could (at least in principle) make possible new kinds of
scientific hypotheses. These hypotheses should be better suited to the distinctive
character of the microbial world, and thereby likely to enhance our knowledge of it,
including our knowledge of its evolution.
We will briefly sketch some novel types of scientific claims (and even scientific
research programmes) that could quite naturally follow from the recognition of the
ontological classes described above: processually equivalent entities, processually
versatile entities, and stabilized entities.
PE-entities are defined by the detection of high degrees of similarity in the causal
chains in which a set of entities occurs. The cases of present interest are those in
which a particular class of PE-entities includes members that are structurally or
genealogically quite distinct. PE-entities may be found within one level of
biological organisation (e.g. when genes from distinct gene families code for the
same step of a metabolic pathway), but they can also belong to distinct levels of
biological organisations (e.g. when phage or plasmid protein mimics DNA
(McMahon et al. 2009)). Either kind of equivalence suggests that the functions
shared by the various PE entities are significant for the sustainable functioning of
entities within the microbial world, since the functions have evolved, and
presumably have been selected for, on more than one occasion.
An interesting empirical question to explore is whether the number of PE-entities
increases over evolutionary time. Are PE-entities favoured by selection as providing
resources that can be used in diverse ways or should one, rather, expect natural
selection to find, eventually, the unique entity that best serves each particular
biological function? In the case of the flu virus mimicking histones with another
protein (Marazzi et al. 2012), the evolution of histones preceded that of its mimic,
suggesting that processual equivalence has evolved in relatively recent time.
Hypotheses about the lineages, the environments and the functions in which
processual equivalence is more common could also be used to delineate crucial
features underlying the diversity of the microbial world. These features could then
help to identify the entities that humans could most effectively target in their
attempts to control, or counteract, pathogens in the microbial world.
Moonlighting, or PV-, entities raise different types of questions. Their flexibility,
their ability to act in diverse and distinct causal chains, suggests the hypothesis that
PV-entities are ancient generalists with high evolvability, which has contributed to
the success of a wide range of lineages. Alternatively, however, such entities could
be quite recent evolutionary innovations in the microbial world, an idea that seems
at least plausible, since the evolution of single entities able to fulfil multiple distinct
roles can be advantageous in terms of cellular economy. These competing
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possibilities suggest the desirability of scientific research programmes that try to
quantify the prevalence of versatility among known entities, in order to test whether
some higher level entities are particularly rich in ‘‘moonlighting’’ lower level
entities (for example, whether there exist species particularly well equipped with
multifunctional proteins).
The distribution of PV-entities might be relevant to investigation of the
biogeographical distribution of microbial entities. It could encourage investigation
of whether moonlighting entities are required to explain the wide distribution of
microbial kinds: if ‘everything is everywhere, but the environment selects’ (Baas-
Becking 1934, cited in O’Malley 2008), moonlighting entities might be selected
more frequently than other kinds. A higher proportion of versatile components
would indeed enable related organisms to be successful in a wide range of different
environments and consortia. Further, when entities move between higher level
entities (for example genes moving between genomes) the moonlighting potential of
the lower level entity might prove crucial in explaining the success of the entity in
being viable or advantageous in new contexts, and hence globally successful. Of
course, these two classes of entities, PE and PV are not mutually exclusive. Two
entities may be processually equivalent in one context, whereas each of them may
be capable of performing quite different functions in other contexts, and hence may
be processually versatile.
Stabilized entities could raise even more fundamental questions for evolutionary
microbiology. In fact, stabilisation is not really a problem for a standard ontology,
because this ontology assumes the stability of entities. By contrast, in our extended
ontology the evolution of stabilisation (and of mechanisms of stabilisation) in the
microbial world becomes a major issue. In the example of integrated cyanophage
and cyanobacterial communities, in which entities from at least three levels of
biological organisation are involved, stabilisation is not achieved just by one
particular entity, or at a single level. While cyanobacteria certainly need to limit the
infection rate by cyanophages, an absolute end to the genetic exchanges with these
phages might be detrimental. Questions of stabilisation concern fine-tuning of the
interactions between these entities through which their stability is optimized.
Recognition of such stabilized entities might then inspire a more general search for
mechanisms facilitating stabilisation (e.g. non homologous repair systems able to
integrate foreign genes in genomes without killing the host (Weller et al. 2002;
Shuman and Glickman 2007)), and lead to investigations of how these mechanisms
are distributed, and how eventually they can be moderated or bypassed (to prevent
integration, or slow down the rate of evolution of an entity).
More fundamentally, however, the consideration of stabilisation processes in the
microbial world indicates that the entities scientists work with are only relatively
stable, their stability being dependent on the processes that sustain the functional
integration of their parts. This observation has an important practical consequence
on questions of origins, such as for instance the origin of eukaryotes or the origin of
microbial species. Answers to such questions should not be phrased in terms of
stable entities: there is no such thing as the first eukaryote, or the first representative
of a particular species. There is, however, a process through which a certain level of
stabilised functional integration is eventually reached (Lawrence and Retchless
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2010). In the process of stabilisation that leads to a new kind of entity (and which
happens at variable rates for different entities), we could have no way to distinguish
the putative first entity from the entity one generation before. It would also be
crucial to study the time scales of the stabilisation of the (relatively stable)
phenotypes that are analyzed by evolutionary biologists (e.g. the stabilisation of the
eukaryotic organisation from the initial merger of distinct prokaryotic partners, the
stabilisation of a particular metabolic pathway, etc.).
Conclusion
In this paper we have called for a more expansive evolutionary ontology for
microbiology and a more egalitarian treatment of the diverse kinds of entities and
processes familiar in the mainstream of microbiology, but sometimes downplayed in
importance due to excessive concern with the specific perspective of vertical
inheritance. We have also sketched a mode of representation that could facilitate the
move away from a narrowly phylogenetic framework for biology generally. While
the phylogenetic framework usually relies on a tree-based representation, we
suggested that networks could provide a broader framework, in particular because
these latter graphs can represent both cyclic and acyclic relationships, and do not
assume that all entities under study are connected. Even if one does not want to
endorse all aspects of the ontological expansion we propose, our network model
might still offer a powerful alternative to the more traditional evolutionary
framework. Underlying these proposals is an exploration of the sometimes
fundamental implications of taking seriously the idea that biology is, or at least
can be usefully conceived as, process all the way down. One motivation for
advocating this perspective is that it allows us to raise a wide variety of important
questions that do not readily arise within a more traditional ontological framework.
Indeed, many of these questions would simply not make sense in the context of the
traditional evolutionary ontology. They could, however, lead to the discovery of
general features crucial for the maintenance of the microbial world, flexible features
central to explaining the success of diverse lineages of entities, and mechanisms that
facilitate the integration of lower level entities into a higher level entity. The ideas
we propose are likely to be regarded as controversial; but we think that the potential
payoffs that they might offer are sufficiently impressive to make the attempt to
explore them in more detail worth the effort.
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